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I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades' rapid proliferation of statutory business organization forms has, depending on whom one asks, created a cause for either celebration or concern. For many courts and commentators, this development has generated a more permutated menu of tax treatments, liability limitations, and governance structures, thereby allowing firms to better match their legal status with their organizational needs. For others, the repercussions are more ambiguous, and may be a harbinger of increased strategic behavior, cost externalization, and/or distributional inequity. Interestingly, though, throughout all this statutory innovation, one traditional legal doctrine appears to have persisted: fiduciary duty. Although the obligors and beneficiaries of such duties may vary by organizational form, fiduciary duties appear to undergird the legal governance structures of virtually every statutory business entity.
Nevertheless, these same decades have witnessed a bourgeoning (and often contentious) debate over the normative relationship between fiduciary standards and ownership structure. Some have argued that managers in "closely-held firms" (e.g., close corporations and partnerships) should be subject to significantly more onerous fiduciary obligations than are their counterparts in public corporations. Lacking the convenient exit options and the concomitant external discipline provided welldeveloped securities markets, the argument goes, participants in closely-held firms must rely exclusively (or nearly so) on fiduciary obligations to deter opportunism. 1 Critics have challenged this view, pointing out that the larger ownership stake typically possessed by managers of closely-held firms requires them to bear a substantial share of the costs from their decisions. Moreover, closely-held firms frequently involve participants with long-standing (indeed often familial) relationships-a source of repeat interaction that facilitates the formation of extralegal behavioral norms to stem managerial misfeasance. Consequently, this argument
In the pages that follow, I aspire (however imprudently) to enter the fray. I propose to do so, however, not by surveying its traditional battle lines, but rather by rather by viewing the debate through the lens of a "team-production" theory of the firm. In its most basic form, the team-production account spotlights the observation that productive activities within many economic organizations require coordinated, firm-specific investments from two or more participants. (Stronger forms of this account posit that team structures are pervasive within commercial activity, and are in fact the defining characteristic of all multi-person firms).
3 Despite a growing attraction to the team-production model within both industry and the academy, 4 it poses unique challenges to organizational governance. In particular, the "output" produced by a team is frequently non-separable in nature, thereby frustrating attempts to deduce ex post the contributions of individual team members. 5 This form of noncontractibility can exacerbate problems of opportunism, 6 which in turn can reduce the overall productive capacity of the team. But within this quagmire of opportunism lies a potentially important role for law. Indeed, appropriately-crafted legal rules can (and arguable should) play a significant role in mollifying team-production dilemmas, reshaping the incentive structure faced by team members to enhance the well-being and productivity of the firm's participants.
So animated, a team-production approach can inject helpful new insights into an already well-trodden debate over the relationship between organizational structure and fiduciary obligation. This Article endeavors to expose one of them. Explicitly, I shall argue that enhanced fiduciary duties within closely-held firms can impose (somewhat counter-intuitively) significant strategic costs on the members of a productive team-costs that are largely avoidable within public corporations.
The intuition behind this argument bears tangential resemblance to the "multitasking" literature in economics, which posits that high-powered incentive contracts may be an undesirable way to solve moral hazard problems, particularly when an agent divides her time between multiple productive activities and only a subset of those activities yields a verifiable output. Such arguments have been used, for example, to critique the use of merit pay for teachers based on students' standardized test scores, for fear that teachers would rationally substitute away from covering E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd Furthermore, these strategic costs may, at least in some circumstances, be sufficiently grave to undermine the potential productivity of the team, thereby constituting an argument for weaker (rather than stricter) fiduciary obligations within in certain closely-held organizations.
The core of my argument is extremely simple. If one supposes that a principal purpose of fiduciary law is to deter intra-firm opportunism, 7 then the substantive content of legal duties should, as a normative matter, be sensitive to the composition and incentives of the productive "team" in question. In closely-held firms, participants generally find themselves wearing dual hats: those who engage in productive activities are quite often the same individuals who are its residual claimants, and thus the presumptive enforcers of fiduciary obligations. 8 Within such a context, an enhanced fiduciary duty engenders two competing strategic effects on the parties' behavior. The first stems from the fiduciary's increased fear of being "caught" behaving opportunistically. This effect represents an unambiguous incentive for her to refrain from engaging in such activities. But a second, competing effect also emerges. Enhanced fiduciary obligations increase the expected returns from successfully detecting a fellow team member's misfeasance. This latter effect can give team members an incentive to step up their efforts at monitoring one another, leaving them less time to engage in productive activities. In what follows, I shall refer to these two competing effects, respectively, as the deterrence effect and the monitoring effect. Significantly, which of these two effects dominates in equilibrium is (at least on a priori grounds) indeterminate. Consequently, in evaluating whether an enhanced fiduciary duty is justified within closely-held firms, one must first inquire whether the consequent deterrence effects are likely to outweigh the monitoring effects. Should this tradeoff cut in the other direction, then not only might a strict fiduciary standard be inadvisable, but it may even be optimal to dilute-perhaps significantly-the relative bite of fiduciary duties within such organizations. One might, of course, posit that the "shareholder primacy" view of fiduciary duties is indefensible, and that the legitimate beneficiaries of fiduciary duties should include other nonmanagerial consistencies. See, e.g. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, ___ (Del. 1985) (allowing directors to take into account the impact of a tender offer on non-shareholder constituencies in formulating defensive strategies). Nothing in this article turns on a shareholderprimacy view, however. (In fact, throughout my analysis, I shall adopt a joint-welfare measure in defining an "optimal" level of fiduciary duties). What is critical, however, is that the principal beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in publicly held firms be distinct from the members of the productive team.
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It is, of course, possible for publicly-held firms to structure the compensation packages of corporate managers in a way that encourages mutual monitoring. At the same time, however, doing so is but one of many options for a publicly-held firm. In a closely-held firm, the option does not exist. 12 There may be other strategic issues relevant to intra-firm policing. For example, a potential defendant might be inclined to expend wasteful effort on defensive (or "paper-shredding") activities so as to reduce the possibility of a successful suit. I do not touch on this effect in this Article, however, predominantly because such defensive measures would be equally applicable in both closely-and widely-held firms. 13 See, e.g., Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 116 (1993) (arguing that fiduciary duties "serve to guide the parties to a standard of behavior that reduces the need to monitor," but generally omitting considerations of the incentive to monitor) (italics added); Larry Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duties in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1991 n.63 (1990) (arguing that the business judgment rule is unnecessary in close corporations because of the relative ease of intra-firm monitoring, but also omitting considerations of incentives to monitor). In some ways, the widely-held firm accomplishes many of the same effects as does E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd Widely-held firms (such as public corporations), in contrast, generally do not-or at least need not-manifest the strategic tension described above. Indeed, the principal beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in widely-held firms are by definition not the managers, but rather a third-party (such as shareholders 10 ) who are generally not members of the productive team. As such, it is the shareholders (or more often their elected representatives on the board of directors) who possess the greatest incentives to monitor managerial opportunism. Managers, meanwhile, largely dispossessed of the incentive to monitor one another, experience only the deterrence effect upon an enhancement of their fiduciary obligations.
11 Consequently, the issue of which strategic effect dominates plays a smaller role within the widely-held firm, and thus plays no role in assessing the optimal level of fiduciary duties.
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This insight, which appears to have been largely neglected in the corporations literature, 13 poses interesting consequences from both statutory and doctrinal 14 For the impatient reader, these variations consider the effects of (1) verifiable inputs; (2) severe free riding; (3) deep pockets; (4) non-team beneficiaries; (5) coordination failures; and (6) repeat play. See infra TAN ___-___. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd perspectives. Indeed, my analysis suggests that the participants in some closely-held firms (i.e., those dominated by deterrence effects) are well-served by a strict fiduciary governance structure, while others (i.e., those dominated by monitoring effects) are better suited by relaxed standards. From a statutory perspective, this observation provides a possible rationale for maintaining heterogeneity among business organization statutes, thereby affording firms the advantages of regulatory selfselection. But in the absence of such statutory heterogeneity, my argument suggests that courts, in adjudicating such cases, would be well-advised take intra-firm monitoring costs into account before prescribing the applicable quantum of fiduciary obligation.
The remainder of this paper contains four sections. Section II briefly describes the existing legal and institutional milieu that surrounds the relationship between fiduciary duties and organizational structure, exposing the rough contours of the debate that continues to engulf the case law and the business governance literature. Section III, which represents the core of the Article, analyzes a simple game-theoretic example of team production. Using this example, I demonstrate how an enhanced fiduciary duty within closely-held firms can (though need not always) detract from a team's overall productivity, and I explain why this concern is largely absent within widely-held organizations. The section concludes by exploring the robustness of the example in light of six plausible variations on its assumptions.
14 Section IV gives some preliminary thoughts on the legal implications of this analysis, exploring how doctrine and/or statutory authority might best accommodate my principal thesis. Finally, section IV presents concluding remarks.
II. THE LEGAL MILIEU
Before plunging into the specifics of my argument, it is necessary to situate it within the larger doctrinal debate over the relationship between fiduciary obligations and ownership structure. This section attempts (however briefly) to do so, 570-85 (1997) . Although the merits of this claim ultimately depend on one's jurisprudential interpretation, even if it is true it says little about the historical content of fiduciary duties as a default matter. Moreover, because fiduciary duties are probably the most difficult to provide for with express contract terms, the content of default rules can often be extremely important. See TAN _-_, infra.
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E.g., Frankel, supra note 6, at 830. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd concentrating on three central characteristics of the debate. First, while fiduciary duties transcend all business organization forms, the strictness with which such duties are applied has been neither uniform nor consistent. Second, this lack of uniformity has spawned both judicial and academic debates about whether and how organizational form should affect the content of fiduciary obligations. Finally, the participants in this debate have ended up largely at analytical loggerheads-a quandary that a team-production approach may help to resolve.
It is perhaps most appropriate to begin an account of the evolution of fiduciary obligations within partnerships. Indeed, partnership law (unlike its statutory cousins) is a unique artifact of the common law, albeit one that is now largely codified in every state. Moreover, it was here where Benjamin Cardozo left his now-infamous doctrinal epitaph, in Meinhard v. Salmon, likening a fiduciary to a trustee, and imposing a duty that required both "uncompromising rigidity" and the "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive," as the standard for fiduciary comportment. 15 Cardozo's approach, like that of numerous judges and theorists who both preceded and followed him, 16 conceived of fiduciary obligations as originating from fundamental moral precepts, and therefore provided an immutable check on market behavior-a view largely inherited from the English ecclesiastical and equity courts. 17 As this doctrinal view evolved, courts began routinely to hold that a partner's fiduciary duty extended not only to the partnership entity, but also to each partner individually. 18 Some have augmented this approach with more economic arguments, maintaining that strict standards of comportment are necessary to induce participants to enter into an arrangement of power and vulnerability.
Be that as it may, recent years have produced both doctrinal and statutory innovations that have chipped away at this ancestral mantle of uncompromising honor. The Revised Uniform Partnership Act, now statutory authority in twenty-two states 20 has contributed significantly to this trend. The RUPA expressly confines a partner's duty of loyalty to three particularized manifestations: (1) accounting for profits derived from partnership business; (2) refraining from dealing with the partnership as an adverse party without consent; and (3) refraining from competing with the partnership before dissolution. 21 Moreover, it makes clear that a partner is not the functional equivalent of a trustee, and consequently she does not necessarily run afoul of her fiduciary duties simply by engaging in actions that create a private benefit. 22 Third, the RUPA also imports a contractual standard of "good faith and fair dealing" by which to judge a partner's discharge of her fiduciary duties (although it then proceeds to muddy the waters considerably by shrouding this obligation in more traditional fiduciary garb 23 ). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the RUPA partially relaxes the immutability of fiduciary duties, permitting a partnership agreement the limited power to prescribe standards for measuring compliance with fiduciary duties in particular activities. 24 This trend has been echoed in recent case law. For example, it is now quite unremarkable for courts to accord substantial teleological deference to controlling factions within a partnership who invoke a provision in a partnership agreement to expel one of their counterparts.
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(expulsion of a partner for engaging in political speech). But see Beasley v. Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, 1996 WL 438777 (Fla. Cir. Ct.) (holding that partners breached their fiduciary duty by expelling a branch office partner when no expulsion provision existed in the partnership agreement). An application of my central thesis to Bohatch can be found in section IV, infra.
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A recent Lexis search reveals that there are approximately 900 federal and state cases that cite the famous paragraph from Meinhard, and its popularity (at least for rhetorical value) apparently continues. See, e.g., NCAS Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. Nat'l Corp, 143 F.3d 38 (2 nd Cir., 1998) ("A partner, as a fiduciary, is held to higher standards than those of the marketplace. 'Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior' ") (citing Meinhard). At the same time, however, this gradual relaxation of traditional fiduciary duties has not gone unqualified. One can to this day still find numerous examples in which modern courts appear to harken back (at least rhetorically) to the spirit of strict standards enunciated in Meinhard. 26 Furthermore, the RUPA also introduced a fiduciary duty of care-a concept that was largely absent within the old Uniform Partnership Act and much of the relevant case law-which proscribes the grossly negligent, reckless, or intentional misconduct of a partner. 27 The Act also prohibits partnership agreements from either waiving fiduciary duties writ large, or attempting to soften fiduciary duties in a way deemed to be manifestly unreasonable 28 -a constraint that is arguably more onerous that imposed on corporations.
29 Mimicking this doctrinal ambivalence, academic commentators have exhibited substantial discord in recent years over whether recent trends in fiduciary duty standards within partnerships are justifiable on normative grounds.
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In contrast to the strict fiduciary duties historically imposed on partners, managers of public corporations have for some time faced a somewhat more relaxed set of fiduciary duties. Most corporate statutes, while facially prohibiting self-dealing by officers and directors, proceed almost immediately to supply numerous exceptions (both procedural and substantive) that will cleanse a self-interested transaction. Delaware's statute on self-dealing, for example, allows an interested transaction to occur under three distinct circumstances: (1) disclosure and approval by disinterested directors; (2) disclosure and approval by shareholders; or (3) approval by directors or shareholders (whether interested or not) and fairness of the transaction to the corporation. 31 Moreover, the duty of loyalty appears to be largely ineffectual when the purported consequences of self-serving behavior have a significant non-monetary component. 32 Finally, in order to seek redress from purported violations, shareholders are often required to bring derivative actions, a process made extremely difficult by procedural obstacles such as demand requirements and the deference given to special litigation committees (which often act as gatekeepers against such suits).
33
The fiduciary duty of care within public corporations is arguably even more marginalized, largely swallowed up by two significant exceptions. The powerful "business judgement rule" essentially acts as a legal presumption that corporate fiduciaries have exercised requisite skill in carrying out their appointed duties-a presumption that can be overcome only by a showing of managerial recklessness, fraud, or waste. 34 Additionally, many states now have so-called "exoneration statutes," which either permit (or sometimes mandate) liability limits and/or indemnification for a fiduciary's violation of her duty of care. 35 The power of these The historical discontinuity in fiduciary duty law between partnerships and public corporations has made the close corporation a troublesome battleground for courts and commentators. Often dubbed "incorporated partnerships," close corporations share a number of the same structural characteristics with their unincorporated counterparts. As with partnerships, it is not uncommon for all (or most) shareholders in a close corporation to exercise managerial duties at the firm. 37 Moreover, the residual claimants in both organizations lack access to thick capital markets to sell their shares. This deficiency both makes it more costly for dissatisfied owners to exit, and it impedes the prospect of outside monitoring through the market for corporate control, a non-trivial source of discipline for managers in public corporations. 38 These similarities have not gone unnoticed by a number of courts, who have advocated treating corporate fiduciaries in closely-held firms using the same 39 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515-16 (Mass. 1975) (stating that shareholders of close corporations "must discharge their management and stockholder responsibilities in conformity with [a] strict good faith standard," in contrast to directors and shareholders of widely-held corporations, who are subject to a "somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty"). Cf. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976) (likening the fiduciary duties of close-corporation shareholders to those that general partners, but qualifying the duty with a balancing test that hinges on whether the complained-of act can be justified on the grounds of serving a "legitimate business purpose"). 40 See, e.g., Hetherington and Dooley, supra note 1, at 2 (arguing that a close corporation is the "functional equivalent" of a partnership, and advocating the creation of a "put" option for dissatisfied shareholders in a close corporation); Mahoney, supra note 1 (arguing same); F. Hodge O'Neal, Preventative Law: Tailoring the Corporate form of Business to Ensure Fair Treatment of All, 49 MISS. L. J. 529, 533 (noting that the purpose of forming a close corporation stems solely from a desire for limited liability or other considerations distinct from fiduciary obligations. See also Blair and Stout, supra note 1, at ___. Blair and Stout briefly consider the famous holding in Dodge v. Ford, 170 NW 668 (Mich. 1919) that a director and controlling shareholder (Henry Ford) could not legitimately refuse a demand from minority shareholders that the corporation distribute its profits in dividends rather than reinvesting it in new corporate projects. Blair and Stout argue that the court's lack of deference to Ford's business judgment in this case was perhaps justified because the firm was a close corporation. Id. 39 Some within the academy have concurred, arguing that the partnership analogy is sufficiently strong to warrant the weakening of a number of the legal defenses afforded to fiduciaries of public corporations, such as the business judgement rule. 40 On the other hand, not all courts and commentators have been equally infatuated with the partnership metaphor. Delaware, for example, remains somewhat agnostic about the wholesale importation of fiduciary duties from partnership law when a close corporation has not clearly manifested a desire to be governed by such obligations. 41 Moreover, many critics maintain that the analogy misses a number of practical differences between partnerships and close corporations (such as participation/withdrawal rules, relationship-specific investments, and information asymmetries) that might have a substantive effect on the optimal content of fiduciary obligations.
42 Perhaps more pointedly, some argue, the procedurally-costly decision to incorporate may signal an express desire of a firm's participants to be subjected to 43 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 250 (criticizing other commentators who presume that these other legal consequences are the sole driving forces behind incorporation). 
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It is here where the debate over the relationship between fiduciary duties and ownership structure largely resides. Recent statutory innovations, such as limited liability companies, limited liability partnerships, and limited liability limited partnerships, have done little to broker a peace. If anything, the lack of a welldeveloped fiduciary duty doctrine within such forms has simply added fuel to an already caustic fire. 44 This continuing discord is undoubtedly due to a number of factors, not the least of which is a profound disagreement over the fundamental purpose of fiduciary duties. 45 But even so, other characteristics of the debate are equally unsettling. Those advocating the partnership analogy to close corporations, for example, must contend with a significant challenge of explaining why existing statutory heterogeneity seems to have given rise to behavioral heterogeneity. In other words, if certain types of government structures were unambiguously conducive to wasteful, managerial rent-seeking, then why haven't most or all managers pushed their firms in that direction? Similarly, those who advocate the merits of regulatory self-selection have largely failed to explain precisely what factors would drive some closely held firms to favor strict fiduciary standards while others would favor weaker ones.
A team-production approach, however, may lend analytical insights that help resolve these questions. The next section focuses on one such insight, arguing that a team-production perspective reveals an underappreciated distinction between widely-and closely-held organizational structures. In widely-held firms, the monitoring of management can be conducted by a separate third-party "hierarch" (such as a board of directors), whose primary purpose is to keep tabs on managerial misconduct. Within closely-held firms, however, this monitoring task can only come from one source: the managers themselves, monitoring one another. The
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To be sure, this distinction is an aggregate one, and many other permutations exist. For instance, although public corporations in the United States are characterized by diffuse ownership structures, there are numerous public corporations in which a control share is nonetheless owned by a member of management. Conversely, within some close corporations and partnerships, management does not have a significant ownership share. See, e.g., R. La Porta, F. Lopes-d-Silanes, and A. Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, NBER Working Paper 6625 (1998).
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd consequences of these distinct intra-firm monitoring structures, I shall argue, holds important consequences for both statutory design and doctrinal application.
III. MONITORING, DETERRENCE, AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES: AN EXAMPLE
In this section, I endeavor to illustrate my principal argument more formally, analyzing a stylized numerical example of team production within two different governance régimes. Under the first régime, team members play dual roles as both productive contributors and mutual monitors; under the second, an intervening hierarch takes on all monitoring duties within the firm, leaving other team members engage solely in productive activities. As a general matter, the former of these structures is intended to be representative of a closely-held firm-such as a close corporation or general partnership-in which the putative "owners" of the firm also tend to play an important role in productive decisions. Correspondingly, the latter of these governance structures is more analogous to a paradigmatic public corporation, in which shareholders play little or no role in productive activities, but act (individually or through their board of directors) as auditors or monitors of management.
46 I shall use this analysis to demonstrate that rigorous fiduciary duties, while perhaps justifiable on independent grounds, can pose unique problems for closely-held firms by creating inefficient incentives to substitute monitoring activities for productive effort.
Before beginning, however, I caution the reader that the analysis presented below is admittedly stylized, designed to isolate the interaction between fiduciary duties and governance form in a static setting. While certainly helpful for developing intuitions, models such as this probably fail to capture at least some of the complexity and nuance that pervade real-world situations. Consequently, one might be able to generate variations in which monitoring costs, while present, are insufficiently compelling to justify the distinction in fiduciary law that I advocate. Indeed, after walking the reader through the basic numerical example, I shall explicitly analyze six such variations. Nevertheless, the tradeoff between monitoring and productive activities is, I believe, endemic to close governance structures, and is therefore almost always a legitimate consideration in the design of fiduciary duties (even if not ultimately a determinative one in every instance).
47
I shall comment on the effects of relaxing this assumption infra at TAN ___-___. 48 The alert reader will note that I refer to "effort"-a term more consistent with duties of care than duties of loyalty (which call for terms such as"self denial" or "finest loyalty"). I do so predominantly to maintain consistency with the literature on moral hazard, or "hidden actions." See, e.g., Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) . From an technical perspective, failure to expend effort is indistinguishable from re-directing hard assets away from the firm and to one's individual account. In this analytic respect, a moral-hazard model does not distinguish between "shirking" and "stealing", even though fiduciary duty law does attempt to do so. Though I do not attempt to make any meaningful distinction between these actions here, there is a live enterprise among corporations scholars generating explanations as to why these two problems are (or should be seen as) distinct. 
a. Framework
Consider a productive enterprise ("the firm") that requires a team for the completion of a revenue-generating project. Although the precise nature of the project is not of particular relevance, suppose for concreteness that it involves the production and sale of a single idiosyncratic good, which is both specialized and difficult to manufacture. As a consequence of the relatively small market and the firm's capacity constraint, the firm will sell either zero or one item. Should the firm succeed at making a sale, however, it will reap a profit of $100. Otherwise the project yields nothing.
The prospect of a successful sale hinges (in part) on the efforts of a twoperson productive team within the firm, denoted as "Player A" and "Player B," respectively. Each player is risk-neutral and possesses limited wealth (normalized arbitrarily to be zero 47 ). Moreover, each player is assumed to make an unmonitorable choice about whether to expend "high" or "low" effort in productive activities. Encouraging high effort by the team members is important because it enhances the likelihood the project succeeds (i.e., a sale is made).
48 Accordingly, the likelihood of a success (and thus a payoff of $100 for the firm) is a function of the players' effort level, as illustrated in Table 1 below. 49 This assumption is "somewhat" arbitrary, because in order for collective action problems to be present, the private cost of high effort must lie somewhere between the private benefits and the joint benefits of effort of increased effort. Note that the assumption that low effort costs the agent nothing is without loss of generality. The key from an agency-costs perspective is that high effort is more expensive than is low effort, a condition that is obviously satisfied here. To see this, simply note that the expected profits of the firm if both players expend high effort are $80, less the $16 in joint effort costs, for a social net surplus of $64. In contrast, if only one party expends high effort, the expected net social surplus is $62 (= $70 -$8). Finally, if neither expends high effort, the expected net social surplus is $50. Hard work, however, does not come cheap. In particular, I assume that while it is costless for a player to expend a low effort, expending high effort imposes a nonmonetary cost on her, which I shall assume (somewhat arbitrarily) to be $8. 49 It is this personal cost of effort that animates the chief incentive problem in this model: For while the costs of effort are borne privately, A and B may not be able to appropriate the full value of their contributions; moreover, the beneficiaries of A's and B's effort depend (in part) on the ownership structure of the firm. Thus, for example, if A and B were in a general partnership, they would (at least as a default matter) split the profits of the firm evenly. 50 Alternatively, if A and B managed the firm on behalf of a third party, their payoffs would consist of their expected wages from the firm, with the third party claiming any residual surplus. This observation suggests that the players might choose to withhold high effort in some circumstances, even though joint expenditure of high effort would be the socially efficient choice.
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As an initial matter, each player's actual choice of effort is private information. However, it may be possible for others to detect whether an agent withholds effort by monitoring her behavior. Explicitly, suppose that there exists a good (but not perfect) monitoring technology which, if utilized, can detect a player expending low effort 4-out-of-5 times (i.e., a low-effort player will be "caught" 80% of the time). The monitoring technology entails no false positives: should a player expend high This assumption may be relaxed, but doing so provides few insights and detracts from analytical clarity. 53 Other permutations are of course possible in a public corporation. Indeed, the third party might engage in monitoring and also give the other parties incentives to monitor one another. As the reader shall see, however, in those situations where monitoring creates multi-tasking problems, the existence of the third party is critical precisely because she can take all the monitoring duties out of the hands of the agents.
Moreover, because it is predominantly the shareholders that benefit from fiduciary duties in public corporations, the incentive of the shareholders to monitor managers is, as a default matter, greater than the incentives of managers to monitor one another. 54 The costs of monitoring and effort are assumed equal simply for convenience. It is possible to generalize to other monitoring cost values without substantially affecting the qualitative arguments presented below. I shall take up the possibility of varying monitoring costs infra at Section IV.
In some situations, of course, one might argue that monitoring and productive effort are complements rather than substitutes, and that it is essentially costless to monitor when one is expending productive effort. In such situations, the tradeoff between monitoring and productivity clearly is absent. Such pure complementarity, however, seems unlikely in most organizations. Indeed, although there may be some basic elements of effort (such as keeping long hours in the office) that enhance ones monitoring capabilities, other elements of productive effort require sustained attention from the individual team member-attention that is compromised if she is also keeping tabs on the activities of her counterparts at the firm. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd effort, she will never be detected erroneously as shirking. 52 Moreover, it is assumed that detection by the monitor is verifiable in court (and therefore potentially the basis of a subsequent action for breach of fiduciary duty).
The identity of the monitor (should any monitoring occur) once again depends on the ownership structure of the firm. If the firm is closely-held, then any monitoring of the players' actions must necessarily come from A and B themselves, monitoring one another. If, however, the firm is organized such that there is a third party capable of monitoring the players (such as shareholders or their representatives in a public corporation), I shall assume that the third party is the sole monitor. 53 Like effort, monitoring is costly: I assume that the monitor (whoever she may be) must incur a private cost of $8 for each player she decides to scrutinize. 54 Having described the fundamentals of the game, it is now possible to consider explicitly the role of fiduciary duty law. As noted in the previous Section, the role of monitor is nearly always concomitant with the identity of the beneficiary of a fiduciary duty. Indeed, partners-who must presumably monitor one another-also owe fiduciary duties both to the partnership and to one another. Managers in a public corporation-who are presumably monitored by shareholders and/or boards-owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, and, at least derivatively, to the shareholders. In an attempt to reflect this practical reality, then, I shall assume that the monitor, should she detect low effort by a player, has the unique legal standing to bring an action 55 The alert reader might object to this definition of fiduciary duty law, arguing that complete disgorgement of a fiduciary's gain is always the presumptive remedy for breaching one's fiduciary duty. The model is capable of accommodating such an interpretation, however. In order to do so, simply reinterpret θ to denote the probability that the fiduciary is found liable, with the presumptive remedy being the fiduciary's private payoff during that period. Because both parties are assumed to be risk-neutral, this description is substantively identical to that in the text.
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I take up the possible effects of relaxing the wealth constraint infra at TAN _-_. 57 See Talley, supra note 8 (discussing the appropriate maximand for the firm, and arguing that absent significant ex ante bonding costs, a joint-wealth objective is probably the most defensible).
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd against the shirking player for breach of fiduciary duty. (Note that because the monitoring technology entails no false positives, all such cases that are brought are legitimate).
Because my ultimate enterprise is to formulate normative arguments about the optimal "strength" of fiduciary duty law within a team-production environment, it is necessary to represent the law in a way that allows variations in its substantive "bite." To this end, I assume that if a player is sued breaching her fiduciary duty, she must disgorge to the plaintiff a fraction of her gross payoff from the game, denoted by the Greek letter "θ." I shall assume that θ must fall somewhere between 0 and 1. The interpretation of θ is quite simple-it is a measure of the relative strength of fiduciary duty law. 55 For instance, θ=0 denotes a duty that is utterly toothless, in which a player who is caught withholding effort need not disgorge any of her private payoff to the aggrieved plaintiff. Conversely, θ=1 denotes a rigorous doctrine, in which a detected shirker must always disgorge her private payoff, leaving her with nothing. (The reader should note, of course, that one could entertain the possibility of an even more stringent fiduciary duty rule, specifying θ>1, representing punitive damages in addition to complete disgorgement. However, because the agent's wealth is limited-and in fact normalized at zero-punitive damages would be unrecoverable, and such a rule would have the same strategic and substantive effect as a complete disgorgement rule of θ=1).
For methodological consistency, I shall adhere in what follows to a modified version of contractarianism, defining a legal rule to be "optimal" if it maximizes the expected joint welfare of all the firm's participants, implicitly asserting that jointwealth maximization is the most plausible outcome of bargaining among the firm's constituents in the absence of transaction and bonding costs. 57 The principal thesis in this article, however, is not exclusively wedded to this particular normative metric. On the contrary, my argument is solely about incentive structure; as such, it holds relevance for virtually any view of the firm positing that fiduciary duties represent an INTRA-FIRM MONITORING & FIDUCIARY DUTIES 58 As noted in note __, supra, the normative view of fiduciary duties as an incentive device appears in both contractarian and communitarian corporations scholarship.
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It is worth pointing out that while each of these posited actions is assumed mutually exclusive, the players are not restricted to selecting one of these actions with certainty. Rather, the equilibria analyzed below also admit mixed strategy profiles, in which a player adopts a strategy that randomizes between two or more pure strategies. A probabilistic mixed-strategy such as this is conceptually similar to a behavior in which one divides her time between the various pure strategies.
60
See TAN ___-___, supra.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd incentive device for deterring individuals from pursuing their own ends at the expense of other constituencies.
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That said, it is now possible to begin analyzing the role of fiduciary duty law in creating-and sometimes confounding-value-increasing investments of effort, and how such effects vary according to the underlying governance structure. Accordingly, the following two subsections examine the role of fiduciary law within (a) a closely-held structure, such as a general partnership, where participants must monitor one another; and (b) a widely-held structure, in which a third-party hierarch is predominantly responsible for monitoring team members.
b. Closely-Held Structure
Consider first a régime in which A and B are organized as a closely-held firm, such as a general partnership or close corporation. A hallmark of such a structure is the dual role played by the participants: they are the principal contributors to the firms productive tasks, and they also share equally in the surplus generated by the firm, thus making them the sole monitors of one another.
Within this environment, then, each player must form strategy according to three mutually exclusive actions (or "pure strategies") that she might pursue. 59 First, she might spend her time exerting high effort in bringing about the project's success (hereinafter denoted as "High Effort"). Alternatively, she might decide to spend her time monitoring her partner's activities, endeavoring to expose whether her counterpart is withholding effort ("Monitor"). Finally, she might decide neither to expend high effort herself nor to monitor her counterpart, but rather simply to expend a low level of effort ("Low Effort"). Recall from above that only if a player chooses "High Effort" does the likely success of the project increase as described in Table 1 . Consequently, at least from the standpoint of the project's success rate, the pure strategy "Monitor" has the same effect as does "Low Effort." 60 Moreover, recall that both "Effort" and "Monitor" are costly actions, imposing a non-monetary cost of $8 on a player who employs them. In contrast, the "Low Effort" strategy represents the analytic baseline and imposes no such costs.
As noted above, I shall assume that the firm is governed by the default rules that apply to partnerships. As such, each partner receives a ½-share of any surplus generated.
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It is important to note that this normal-form representation is "hybridized" because it includes only the expected payoffs of the parties, and not their actual payoffs. Thus, for example, consider the expected payoffs the parties receive if they both expend "High Effort," corresponding to the Northwestern cell in the Figure. In such a situation, neither party will actually ever receive a payoff of $32 (as depicted in the figure), but rather that is the payoff each can expect to receive on average. Explicitly, because both players expend high effort, the probability that the project is a success is 0.8. This implies that 20% of the time the project will prove unsuccessful, and each party's payoff will be equal to -$8, corresponding to the (unrequited) cost of enhanced effort. On the other hand, 80% of the time, the project will be successful, and the players will split the $100 payoff, thereby leaving each with a payoff of $50-$8=$42 (netting out the cost of high effort). In sum, then, the expected or average each player can expect from this pure strategy profile is (0.2)(-$8) + (0.8)($42) = $32. The fact that this normal form expresses expected and not actual payoffs is important particularly if one wishes to analyze the repeat play of this game. In such a dynamic setting, it may be impossible to ensure in a given round whether the other player has withheld effort contrary to some posited dynamic norm of behavior. For further comments on this point, see TAN ___-___, infra.
All other cell values in the Figure are (for the most part) computed in a similar fashion to that described above, and their derivations are therefore omitted. However, because of its slightly more algebraic form, it may be helpful to describe the formulation of the players' payoffs when one player chooses "Monitor" and the other chooses "Low Effort." Consider, for instance, the cell in the South-Central portion of the table, corresponding to a "Low Effort" action by player A and a "Monitor" action by player B. In this cell, because neither player is expending high effort, the probability that the project is a success is 0.5. Accordingly, both A and B can expect to receive a $50 share in profits half of the time. In addition, player B is expending monitoring effort, which costs her $8 with certainty. Finally, because player B is monitoring the behavior of player A, and because player A is withholding effort, there is an 80% chance that B will detect A's actions, in which case A must disgorge to B $50θ whenever the project is a success. Collecting all of these terms, player A's payoff is equal to (0.5)($50) -(0.8)(0.5)($50θ) = $(25-20θ), and player B's payoff is equal to (0.5)($50) -$8 + (0.8)(0.5)($50θ) = $(17+20θ).
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd Because A and B are (by definition) the sole residual claimants on any net surplus generated by the project, their private payoffs are easy to describe. Each payoff consists of three possible components. First, should the project prove successful, each player will receive a one-half share of the firm's payoff, or $50. 61 Second, any player who chooses either to exert effort or to monitor will incur a certain non-monetary cost of $8. Finally, in the event that one player chooses to monitor while her counterpart chooses to do nothing, there is a 4-out-of-5 chance that the latter will be detected, and must disgorge a θ-fraction of her $50 participation should the project be a success. Using these payoffs, it is possible to assemble together a "hybridized" normal-form of this game, illustrating the expected payoffs of the parties from each possible pure strategy profile, illustrated in Figure 1 :
Recall that a "mixed strategy equilibrium" is one in which a player randomizes in equilibrium over various pure strategy actions, never predictably choosing one of them with certainty. In the famous "Rock-Paper-Scissors" game, for instance, the only equilibrium is one with mixed strategies, in which each player randomizes among the three available actions.
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This should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it is generally impossible to induce optimal effort within teams if one is constrained to"budget balancing" mechanisms-i.e., organizational structures in which all the gains and loss from the venture are jointly captured by the team members. See, e.g., Holmstrom, supra note 14. As such, it will turn out than no value of θ is able to induce first-best effort levels by team members if the parties are wealth-constrained. See TAN _-_, infra. Having pieced together the parties' respective payoffs from each possible pure-strategy action, it is now possible to describe the behavior that would plausibly emerge rational play within this strategic setting. Note, however, that because the legal policy parameter (θ) is embedded in the payoff matrix illustrated above, the equilibria from this game may change as one varies the underlying legal rule. Consequently, it is convenient to subdivide the range of θ into three "regions" of severity (corresponding respectively to weak, moderate and strong fiduciary duties).
Consider first a situation in which fiduciary law is relatively weak. Explicitly, suppose that the law mandates that if a player is detected withholding effort, she must disgorge at most half of her contingent share in the project's success to the other party (and perhaps as little as nothing). With such a low-powered incentive structure, it seems unlikely that any value of θ in this region would be capable of inducing maximal effort by the parties. This surmise turns out to be correct. In this region, there are three distinct Nash equilibria, two of them in pure strategies and a third in so-called "mixed strategies."
63 None of them, however, is able to induce socially efficient levels of effort.
Let us begin with the two pure-strategy equilibria, each of which call for one of the players to expend high effort and for the other player to expend low effort.
I.e., she would increase the likelihood of a $100 joint payoff by 10% -from 70% to 80% (remember that Player B is already assumed to be expending high effort) -which translates into an expected increase of $10.
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See note ___, supra.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd
These equilibria correspond to the southwest and northeast cells in Figure 1 . To understand why these are in fact equilibria, let us focus on the southwest cell, which calls for low effort by player A and high effort by player B-a profile that yields expected payoffs of $35 and $27 for A and B, respectively. Consider the incentives of each player, assuming that the other player has adopted the strategy specified by the posited equilibrium. Player A, presuming that Player B will expend high effort, has two alternatives to doing nothing. First, she might choose to expend high effort herself, incurring an $8 effort cost and increasing the expected joint payoff of the project by $10 65 ; but because Player A would have to split this joint gain with her counterpart, she would actually lose $3 on average from working hard, and thus her expected payoff will decrease from $35 to $32. Alternatively, Player A could choose to monitor Player B's actions. Such a choice, however, would be even more foolhardy, since A will expend $8 monitoring a player who she knows (by hypothesis) is expending productive effort-a wasteful expenditure that only reduces A's expected payoff from $35 to $27. Consequently, if A presumes that B is expending effort, A's best option is to do nothing. Now consider Player B's options, under the hypothesis that Player A is expending low effort. He also has two alternatives to expending high effort. First he might choose to expend low effort as well, thereby saving $8, but decreasing the joint payoff of the project by $20; but since Player B stands to lose half of this joint reduction in the joint payoff (or $10), withholding effort would have the net effect of reducing his expected payoff from $27 to $25, and it is therefore unattractive to him. Alternatively, Player B could choose to monitor Player A's actions, redirecting his $8 in effort expense towards monitoring. Once again, foregoing productive effort would result in an expected personal loss to B of $10 (and an expected joint loss of $20); however, monitoring affords B the prospect of detecting A's shirking and recovering a θ-fraction of A's share in a successful project-a prospect that would result in an expected gain for Player B equal to $20(θ).
66 So long as θ #½, then, B would prefer expending effort to monitoring, thereby ensuring that B's best response to A's action is to expend effort. As such, the southwest cell in Figure 1 corresponds with a purestrategy equilibrium of the game so long as θ #½. A virtually identical analysis applies to the other pure strategy equilibrium, represented by the northeast cell of Figure 1 , and is therefore omitted.
In addition to these two pure-strategy equilibria, Region 1 supports a third, mixed-strategy equilibrium, which prescribes that both players randomize between expending high and low effort levels. Explicitly, it calls for each player to expend high effort with probability 0.4, and low effort with probability 0.6. Neither party within 67 To see why this is an equilibrium, consider Player A's choice, conditional on Player B randomizing in the prescribed fashion. Using the values illustrated in Figure 1 , it is clear that if Player A expends high effort, her expected payoff is ($32)(0.4)+($27)(0.6) = $29. Should Player A expend low effort, her expected payoff is ($35)(0.4)+($25)(0.6) = $29. Finally, should Player A spend her time monitoring, her expected payoff is ($27)(0.4)+($17+20θ)(0.6) = $21+12θ # $27 < $29. Thus, if Player B is randomizing in the prescribed way, then Player A is indifferent between high effort and low effort, but is strictly opposed to monitoring. This implies that Player A would be willing to randomize between high and low effort with probabilities 0.4 and 0.6, respectively. An identical analysis applies to Player B.
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See note __, supra.
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For example, the parties could agree up-front that only Player B will expend high effort, but that in compensation for her burden, she will receive approximately 55.7 % of the project's total payoff, with Player A receiving the remaining 44.3 %. Under such an agreement, each player will receive an expected net payoff of approximately $31. 70 For example, if the players were to interact within this context on a repeat basis, they might reach an implicit understanding that one of them would work during one period, and another would work the next. See, e.g., 144 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (1996) (a symposium issue dedicated to the subject of norms and the role of law). I shall return to the notion of norms within a repeat play setting infra TAN _-_. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd this equilibrium engages in monitoring of her counterpart. 67 There are a few interesting features of this equilibrium that bear pointing out. First, it is relatively unpredictable, leaving uncertain from the ex ante perspective whether both players will expend high effort, one will, or neither will. Second, the mixed-strategy equilibrium is the only "symmetric" equilibrium within this region, mandating an identical strategy for each player and generating an identical expected payoff for each player of $29. 68 Finally, in spite of the aesthetic appeal of symmetry, the mixed strategy equilibrium gives rise to a lower expected joint surplus ($58) than that generated by either of the (asymmetric) pure-strategy equilibrium ($62).
It is important to note that the multiplicity of equilibria in this region make it difficult to predict with certainty exactly how rational players would behave in this game. Indeed, this is a problem that is often endemic to game-theoretic approaches, particularly in the context of private information. However, there may be a number of reasons to believe that parties in a commercial setting would end up playing one of the asymmetric equilibria. For instance, if the partnership requires any set-up costs, and A and B both recognize the greater surplus generated by the pure-strategy equilibria, then they may be able to agree on playing one of these equilibria, but mandating that the party who is advantaged in that equilibrium pay the lion's share of the set-up costs. Alternatively, even in the absence of set-up costs, the parties might commit to one of the pure-strategy equilibria, and then reduce slightly the advantaged party's contingent share in the surplus. 69 Finally, even without an explicit agreement to play one of the pure-strategy equilibria, an implicit one may emerge as a result of social norms within the relevant industry. 70 Thus, the analysis that follows will 71 See Tan ___-____, supra.
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Recall from note _, supra that within the posited mixed strategy equilibrium, monitoring E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd generally presume that the two pure-strategy profiles are the most plausible outcomes of this game in Region 1.
ii. Region 2: "Moderate" Fiduciary Duties (½ < θ # b).
Now consider a situation in which fiduciary law is slightly more rigorous, mandating that if a party is detected withholding effort, she must disgorge more than half, but at most two-thirds of her contingent share to the other party. In such a situation, quite obviously, the incentives for parties to monitor and punish shirking are stronger than they were in Region 1. One might conjecture, then, that the higherpowered monitoring incentives in Region 2 would induce greater aggregate efforts on behalf of the parties, and thus greater expected joint welfare. This conjecture, however, turns out to be erroneous. Instead (and somewhat ironically), a moderate fiduciary duty in this region actually detracts from the effort levels expended by the players in equilibrium, reducing the maximum attainable level of social surplus.
In order to understand why, it is perhaps most helpful to recollect the analysis of Region 1, which supported two pure-strategy equilibria, each of which mandating that one player would expend low effort while the other expended high effort. Recall that in order to confirm the existence of such an equilibrium, one had to verify that the party expending high effort-knowing that her counterpart was shirking-was not overly tempted either to expend less effort also or to begin monitoring. This latter temptation to monitor, however, is a direct function of the strength of fiduciary duty law: for if the prospect of recovering damages through monitoring and suit grew too attractive (i.e., if θ>½), then the effort-expending player would have a positive incentive to redirect her attention away from effort and toward monitoring her coventurer. It is exactly this condition that is violated in Region 2. In other words, a stronger fiduciary duty law renders each of these pure strategy equilibria unattainable, by giving the high-effort expending player sufficient incentives to substitute out of productive activities and into re-distributional monitoring activities. Consequently, neither of the pure-strategy equilibria persist within Region 2.
It turns out that the only Nash equilibrium that persists in this region is the same mixed-strategy equilibrium described above, 71 which calls for each party to expend effort with probability 0.4 and to do nothing with probability 0.6. Interestingly, just as before, neither party ever engages in monitoring her counterpart within this equilibrium. Evidently, the moderate strength of fiduciary duties in the Region is enough to destroy the viability of the pure-strategy equilibria, but insufficient to induce greater monitoring and effort levels in the sole remaining (but also less efficient) mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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yielded an expected payoff of $21+12θ, and thus falls short of the $29 expected payoff of the other two strategies so long as θ< 2/3. 73 The unique mixed strategy equilibrium in Region 3 calls for each player to mix among {High Effort, Monitor, Low Effort} with probabilities { 1-2/(5θ), (3θ-2)/(20θ 2 ), (5θ+2)/(20θ 2 ) }. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd equilibrium gives rise to an expected joint surplus $58. In this Region, however, this is the only plausible outcome that emerges from rational play.
iii. Region 3: "Strong" Fiduciary Duties (b < θ # 1).
Finally, consider a situation in which fiduciary law is genuinely rigorous, mandating that if a party is detected withholding effort, she must disgorge more than two-thirds, and potentially all of her contingent share to the other party. In this region, the incentives for parties to monitor and sanction shirking are maximal. And thus, if there is any chance for strong fiduciary duties to play an efficiency-enhancing deterrence role, this is the one. As it turns out, fiduciary duties within this region can play such a role, but one that ultimately falls short of generating enough social wealth to surpass the most efficient outcomes from Region 1.
Note first that just as before, Region 3 is unable to support either of the asymmetric, pure-strategy equilibria that existed in Region 1. In particular, because the prospect of monitoring and suit is sufficiently tempting (i.e., θ>b>½), neither party will be content to expend high effort (rather than monitor) if she knows with certainty that her counterpart is withholding effort.
As such, the only Nash equilibrium in this Region continues to be in mixed strategies. Unlike the mixed-strategy equilibria analyzed for other Regions, however (in which neither party monitored), here the equilibrium calls for the players to randomize among all three pure strategies. Although the exact randomization probabilities vary with θ, 73 they do so in rather predictable ways. Explicitly, as θ increases from 2/3 to 1, the equilibrium probability that each player monitors her counterpart steadily grows, from zero to 0.05. Moreover, this increased monitoring activity carries with it a deterrent effect: over this same interval, the fear of increased monitoring induces each player to increase the probability of expending high effort, from 0.4 to 0.6. Finally (and logically), the probability that each agent expends low effort decreases over this interval from 0.6 to 0.35. All tolled, this equilibrium yields an expected level of joint welfare that varies between $58 and $60.80, distributed evenly between the players. (1 equilibrium)
Region 3
(1 equilibrium)
Region 1 (3 equilibria)
2 / 3 FIGURE 2: MAXIMUM ATTAINABLE JOINT WELFARE AS θ VARIES asymmetric, pure-strategy equilibria. As one moves toward a more moderate fiduciary duty (embodied in Region 2), however, the pure-strategy equilibria cease to exist, and the maximal attainable welfare drops precipitously to $58, corresponding to the unique mixed-strategy equilibrium where players randomize between high and low effort. Finally, as the content of fiduciary duties grows strongest (embodied in Region 3), the unique equilibrium mandates randomization over all the potential strategies, thereby introducing some deterrent effects and achieving an expected joint welfare ranging between $58 (for θ near 2/3) and $60.80 (as θ approaches 1).
It is evident from the Figure that a strong fiduciary duty (within Region 3) can play an efficiency-enhancing role, since it creates incentives for players to monitor each other in equilibrium, thereby deterring one another from engaging in misconduct. Nonetheless, as the Figure demonstrates, such benefits may be unable to eclipse the joint gains generated by either of the pure-strategy equilibria from Region 1-equilibria that are viable only under the very weakest forms of fiduciary duty. Perhaps a more precise way to state this point is as follows:
Strengthening fiduciary duties within closely-held organizations can lead to two conflicting effects: (a) an efficiency-enhancing deterrence effect, stemming from one's enhanced fear of monitoring by her counterparts; and (b) an efficiency-reducing monitoring effect, stemming from one's incentive to forego productive tasks in order to spend more time monitoring her counterparts. Only if the deterrence effect overshadows the monitoring effect will an enhanced fiduciary duty law be justified on efficiency grounds. By corollary, should the
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See TAN _-_, infra.
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Rank-and-file employees, however, are not possibilities, as they are often team members themselves. Note of course that in most cases, the rules of legal standing for derivative and other suits suggest that the shareholders are the presumptive monitors. Indeed, shareholders have the unique ability to sue the corporation derivatively. See Clark, supra note 9, at __.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd monitoring effect outweigh the deterrence effect, it may be optimal to dilute-or even eliminate-the practical bite of fiduciary duties.
It is important to keep in mind that the argument made above has utilized a particular numerical example. As I will demonstrate in subsection (d), it is possible to vary this example in a way so that either the deterrence effect or the monitoring effect would dominate. 74 Nevertheless, because there are no a priori reasons to believe that one effect will predominate in all situations, and because the tradeoff appears endemic to the closely-held organizational structure, the arguments above present a consideration that should always be accounted for in applying fiduciary duty law.
c. Widely-Held Structure
In contrast to the analysis from previous subsection, productive teams within widely-held firms need not manifest the same fundamental tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring effects. Indeed, with the widely-held structure comes the imposition of a third party "hierarch" who, as the principal beneficiary of fiduciary duties, is also the presumptive monitor of managerial opportunism. Within most settings, this third-party hierarch represents public shareholders, as they are the residual claimants on the productive enterprise. For the purposes of my argument, however, this player could be anyone who is not a team member, including lenders, customers, the surrounding community, or a combination thereof. 75 The existence of a shareholder has three effects the incentive structure of the example. First, it facilitates decoupling of business revenues from the payoffs of the team. One of the problems in the closely-held organization is that it is a "budgetbalancing" system: the parties' total gross payoff from the project must always be equal to the revenues the project generated. With an intervening hierarch, however, the aggregate wages paid to the team members need not correspond systematically to the revenues of the project. Second, because of the decoupling of project revenues from wages, the principal is able to craft for the players "incentive pay," promising a high wage in the event the project proves successful, and a low wage (or nothing) if the project fails. Unlike the previous case, in which the players were always presumed to split the $100 revenues, here the hierarch has significantly greater freedom to finetune the contingent rewards of the parties (either upward or downward). Finally, and 76 In each, it is assumed that the hierarch ("H") is the sole monitor of the team members, who also pays wages to players A and B. Just as before, it is assumed that if H detects one of the team members withholding effort, fiduciary law requires that party to disgorge a θ-fraction of her wage to H, where 0# θ # 1. Effort is assumed once again to cost $8 to the players, and it also costs H $8 for each player that she decides to monitor.
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Blair & Stout, supra note 1, posit that the multiple-constituency problem in public corporations may be the reason for the relatively large constraints placed on shareholders who file fiduciary duty actions. Id. at ___. Their analysis, however, leaves rather open-ended the question of how, in the absence of shareholder vigilance, managers will have the appropriate incentives to behave. Id. at ___ (arguing that reputational concerns, altruism, and norms of behavior serve the principal roles of disciplining management).
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I must admit that this argument has always seemed somewhat tenuous. Indeed, while capital markets probably do help mediate the necessity of resorting to litigation, this does not create an independent argument against strict fiduciary duties-but simply a prediction that such rights, if they existed, would rarely be enforced given a lest costly alternative.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd most importantly, the interjection of a hierarch divorces incentives to monitor from incentives to expend effort. As such, team members are no longer required to wear two hats, and thus are not exposed to the countervailing temptations that plagued them above. Moreover, the hierarch takes on a specialized role of monitor, and is also undistracted by other incentives.
The numerical example above, therefore, if analyzed within a widely-held context, tends to behave in a significantly different fashion. Because of space and time constraints, I shall not attempt to walk the reader through yet another arduous exercise in computing equilibrium strategy profiles-indeed, the possibilities of both incentive pay and monitoring would lead to a rather complicated analysis with numerous permutations. Nevertheless, regardless of the permutation, 76 a uniform conclusion appears to obtain: Strong fiduciary duties (i.e., large values of θ) are never harmful, and are sometimes helpful to stem intra-team opportunism. (In technical terms, then, the maximum attainable level social welfare increases (weakly) in θ.)
Despite these differences, there may be a number of other reasons why strong fiduciary duties are inadvisable in public corporations. Some small-stakes shareholders, for example, might wish to use their status as beneficiaries inefficiently to hold up the firm. Moreover, public corporations often have many more relevant constituencies, and according shareholders too many rights might lead to additional influence costs that disadvantage these other constituencies. 77 Finally, the role of thick capital markets may provide exit options and external discipline, thereby rendering the necessity of resorting to fiduciary law superfluous. 78 Nevertheless, concerns over intra-team monitoring appear not to play as significant a role in widelyheld firms as they do in their closely-held counterparts.
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Recall, the earlier example assumed an 80% detection rate with no false positives. One could reduce this detection rate or add the possibility that a hard-working agent will be erroneously detected as shirking. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd
d. Variations, Limitations, and Caveats
Thus far, I have illustrated my principal argument using a single numerical example. Although such devices make for great pedagogy, one must be careful not to overstate the generality of the insights they produce. Consequently, this subsection attempts to explore the robustness of my principal argument, subjecting it to six plausible variations in the model's assumptions. While most of these variations appear to have little effect on the tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring effects, some are capable of reversing the ultimate direction of this tradeoff. This observation, then, suggests that the problem of intra-team monitoring costs may vary across firms, and thus that a heterogeneous regulatory approach towards closely-held firms is warranted.
Verifiable Investments.
Consider first what might happen to the example if the action of each party were relatively cheap to verify. In other words, suppose that the monitoring technology described above were completely accurate and inexpensive to invoke. This variation is equivalent to assuming either that problems of opportunism are largely transparent, or alternatively that monitoring is essentially costless when one is working hard. Not surprisingly, in such situations the trade-off between monitoring and deterrence effects vanishes within a closely-held firm. Indeed, when monitoring no longer carries an opportunity cost, tem members are free to both monitor one another's effort and to expend effort simultaneously. Significantly, however, this variation need not imply the advisability of strong fiduciary duties. Indeed, if a manager's actions are completely verifiable (and thus contractible), then much of reason for having fiduciary duties in the first place also vanishes. In short, absent some problem of opportunism, fiduciary duties are probably not necessary.
Symmetrically, one might conceive of a variation in which the monitoring technology is worse than in the studied example, either because detection is less trustworthy 79 or because monitoring costs are large. Not surprisingly, this variation would tend to strengthen my central argument. To take an extreme case, suppose that monitoring became so inaccurate that a monitoring party would detect cheating eighty percent of the time regardless of whether her counterpart expended effort. In such a situation, the deterrence effect would completely disappear, since one's probability of being detected (and found liable) does not depend on whether she expends effort. On the other hand, the monitoring effect is live and well: by spending all one's time monitoring, one may be able to extract a portion of her counterpart's payoff eighty percent of the time. In such a situation, a strict fiduciary duty could lead to a situation where both parties engage solely in nonproductive monitoring.
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See TAN __-__, supra. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd 2. Severe Free Riding. One canonical feature of the example analyzed above was that it involved free-riding by the team players. Indeed, as the analysis within Region 1 illustrates, it may be an equilibrium for one party to expend effort while the other free-rides on her effort. Nevertheless, the free riding problem could be even more severe than portrayed above. Consider, for example, altering the probabilities given in Table 1 , 80 so that the probability of a success went from 50% (if neither party contributed effort) to 60% (if one of them did) to 70% (if both did). In such a situation, one's marginal expected gain from expending effort is only $5, regardless of the other player's action. Consequently, it is never worthwhile (in the absence of a fiduciary duty) for either party to contribute effort. With severe free riding problems like this, it is more likely that stronger fiduciary duties can play a beneficial role. In particular, an increase in θ may engender at least some equilibrium effort. At the same time, however, the fundamental tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring effects persists, at least on the margin. Although strong fiduciary duties would be optimal for this particular variation, one can construct other variations involving severe free riding in which the tradeoff still militates against the strongest fiduciary duties. As such, this variation does not create a general license to ignore intra-firm monitoring concerns.
Deep Pockets.
Because the numerical example normalized each player's wealth to be zero, the maximum extractable penalty for detected misfeasance was necessarily equal to the party's gross payoff (if any) from the game. Relaxing the parties' wealth constraint would allow the consideration of legal rules that forced detected shirkers to pay punitive damages in excess of their private payoffs from the game. The threat of such added sanctions, as one would expect, can enhance the deterrence effect by increasing the expected costs of opportunism. In terms of Figure  2 , above, this would have the effect of expanding Region 3 rightward, possible enhancing the joint-welfare effects of a strict fiduciary duty rule. As it turns out, sufficient slack in the parties' wealth constraints has precisely this effect in the numerical example above. In particular, if the parties held private wealth of approximately $38 each, then the equilibrium payoffs in Region 3 will surpass those in Region 1, thereby making strong fiduciary duties optimal. Moreover, as one slackens the players' wealth constraints more and more, the equilibrium outcome would tend incrementally (or "asymptotically") to the first-best outcome of $64.
Once again, however, there are at least two limitations to the ultimate power of this proposed variation. First, and most fundamentally, it requires that the parties possess sufficient wealth to make the threat of punitive damages credible. Certainly, such a condition may hold for some closely-held firms, particularly if the firm retains does not distribute a significant portion of its earnings from period to period. However, it is not difficult to find examples where liquidity-constrained partners or managers necessitate regular disbursements, and are essentially judgment proof By the same token, minority/minority status is not material to the text's defense of the Donahue outcome. Under a team-production approach, Mrs. Donahue should benefit from heightened fiduciary duties even if she were the 51% owner of the firm.
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I do not contend, of course, that minority/majority concerns are irrelevant from a fiduciary duty perspective. On the contrary, there are a number of contexts, such as corporate freeze-outs and non pro rata disbursements, in which minority shareholders are at substantial risk. See Rock & Wachter, supra note 11. However, from the specific standpoint monitoring-effort tradeoffs, minority status appears to be somewhat less important than whether a fiduciary beneficiary is also a team member.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd beyond their personal stake in the firm. Second, just as in the previous variation, the marginal tradeoff between deterrence and monitoring persists, a fact that may truncate (in some situations) the gains one might generate from enhanced fiduciary obligations.
Non-Team Beneficiaries.
Recall from the previous subsections that both players A and B were assumed necessary for production at the firm. Indeed, even if one or both of them did not expend effort, their presence on the "factory floor" was critical to generating any payoff whatsoever. In many disputes within closely-held firms, however, a non-productive owner is involved. The well known case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 81 for example-largely credited with introducing the "partnership analogy" to close corporations-involved a plaintiff who was the widow and heir of a deceased shareholder, but played no role in the productive team. Quite clearly, Mrs. Donahue's monitoring of others' actions at the firm did not cause her to substitute out of contributing productive effort-for she served in no productive capacity.
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The possibility of non-productive beneficiaries represents an important limitation to my central thesis. Indeed, in many ways such actors represent the very "third party hierarch" posited to exist characterize a public corporation-a party capable of monitoring without having to sacrifice productive effort. Such individuals, then, may have a stronger claim as fiduciary beneficiaries than do their productive counterparts. Nevertheless, there are a few caveats that deserve mention here. First, it is important to be clear that a "non-productive" beneficiary is not necessarily equivalent to a "minority" or "non-controlling" shareholder. To the contrary, the original example would be just as valid if, for example, if player A owned 51% of the returns (and votes) and player B owned 49%. 83 The critical difference comes when a shareholder (be she minority or majority) is completely outside the productive process. In such situations, a higher standard of fiduciary duty may be justified. 84 Second, it may be important to consider whether non-productive beneficiaries in closely-held firms are as effective in monitoring management as is a specialized Figure 2 that the equilibrium dominance of weak fiduciary duties in Region 1 is predicated (in part) on an assumption that the parties could coordinate on the equilibrium to be played, and that they would systematically rule out any that fail to maximize expected joint surplus. Making this assumption facilitated the assertion that either of the two pure-strategy equilibria were the most plausible outcomes in that region. However, the problem of multiple equilibria may more troublesome than this assumption implicitly asserts. Indeed, some corporations scholars have noted the non-trivial problems imposed by coordination failures 85 within organizations. If one presumes that the parties would be unable to coordinate efficiently within this region, they may end up playing the third, mixed strategy equilibrium profile, which mandated that each player randomize between expending effort and doing nothing. Recall that this equilibrium was identical to the one in Region 2, and it tied for the lowest expected social welfare ($58). Thus, if one is convinced that such coordination failures will occur, and that the law can play no role in effecting coordination among the parties, then it may be best to sacrifice some potential efficiency gains by choosing a legal rule that supports the most efficient unique equilibrium, represented by the strongest fiduciary duty in Region 3.
This criticism, while valid, tends simultaneously to undercut its own persuasiveness. Indeed, the principal problem with multiple equilibria is that there is no good reason to believe that one equilibrium will be played instead of another. But even so, the assertion that players will fail to coordinate (when the stakes to doing so are high) may need as much if not more justification than the assertion that they will. Moreover, the criticism is perhaps too quick to dismiss the ability of legal rules to play an important coordinating role. Consider, for example, the doctrine announced in National Biscuit v. Stroud, 86 a partnership case holding that in a two-person partnership, either partner has authority to continue making purchases on behalf of the partnership with traditional trading partners. Applied to this example, a rule like that in National Biscuit might mandate that if the parties had settled on a work-effort equilibrium in some initial period, the same equilibrium would be applicable in the next period. Such coordination rules tend to play themselves out best in dynamic settings, a consideration to which I now turn.
6. Repeat Play. Finally, it is important to recognize that the numerical example from the text represented a static, one-shot game. Although some business relationships exhibit similarly short durations, many persist over time, affording the opportunity for reputations and norms to develop, forces which can act outside the 87 Bratton, supra note 31, offers an account of the duty of loyalty within a repeat-game context, as a norm of trust and honor. 88 The burgeoning norms literature has attempted to characterize the plausibility of a posited norm using many approaches, ranging from repeat play (which I employ here), to evolutionary behavior, to endogenous preferences. 90 Interestingly, however, the necessity of repeating static equilibrium outcomes does not preclude the choice of a different equilibrium in each period. Thus, for example, the players in a closely-held firm who are subjected to a "weak" fiduciary law (Region 1) may be able to coordinate on a dynamic equilibrium prescribing that they alternate playing the two asymmetric pure-strategy E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd confines of legal rules to transform individual behavior. 87 How, then, would the example above present itself if the parties similarly interacted on a dynamic basis?
Before attempting to answer this question, it probably important to note that dynamic concerns within game theory often pose more problems than they solve. Indeed, a repeat-game context usually exacerbates problems of multiple equilibria, thereby detracting further from game theory's predictive powers. Moreover, without a good alternative theory of how reputations or norms develop (which, for the most part, does not yet exist), there is little to placate the problem of nonfalsifiability.
Nevertheless, one can still conduct a meaningful discussion of what norms are possible (as opposed to probable) within a dynamic setting-a discussion that produces some interesting results. 88 Perhaps the most straightforward consideration concerns what happens when the team-production is repeated a finite period of times. Such contexts seem appropriate for many business organizations, such as partnerships and limited liability companies, whose presumptive life is often finite. Moreover, even for many corporations, whose life is presumed infinite, the anticipated interactions of some team-players may be finite. 89 It turns out (both here and generally) that finite repetition among rational players produces substantially the same equilibrium behavior as does a static environment. Indeed, once the parties arrive at the "last" period of play, they would behave as if it were a static game. Working backwards, then, during the second-to-last period of the game, both players-predicting their endgame behavior-would realize that any attempt to build a reputation for use in the last period would be futile, and they therefore resign themselves once again to behaving as if it were a static game. This inductive process ends up "unraveling" the game all the way back to the first period, so that the best the players can accomplish in a finitely-repeated game is to play out a series static equilibria. 90 As such, when the equilibria. Such a norm lead to a roughly fair average division of the productive rents from the firm.
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Perhaps one small caveat to this conclusion is the possible existence of so-called "irrational" behavior. If there exists a small possibility each of the players has a habitual "taste" for working hard, then each party may have an incentive to behave "as if" she were one of these players in the initial periods of a finitely-repeated game, in order to cash in on that reputation in later periods. See David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts & Robert Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982) . In this particular context, however, such behavior is even harder to support, since there is no perfectly-reliable signal as to whether a player expended effort in the previous period. See infra TAN ___-___.
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As was illustrated above, the content of the underlying legal rule can profoundly affect the one-shot game, which in turn can affect the feasible punishment schemes that enforce a dynamic norm of behavior. See infra TAN ___-___. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd dynamic interaction of the players is limited to finite duration, the repeat-play variation has no appreciable effect on the analysis.
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When rational players interact on an infinitely-repeated basis, however, new equilibria can emerge-equilibria which might fairly be interpreted as "norms" of behavior (though not necessarily extra-legal ones 92 ). The most interesting of such equilibria typically prescribe that the players adopt a set of "cooperative" strategies that would not constitute equilibria of a static game, repeating them indefinitely unless either of the parties defects. Should such a defection occur, however, the dynamic equilibrium would prescribe that the players revert to a "punishment scheme," which generally involves playing out a static equilibrium of the game forever. If the players are sufficiently patient, and punishment scheme sufficiently unattractive, then the posited "cooperative" strategies will constitute a dynamic equilibrium of the game.
Turning our attention to the example in the text, consider the effects of indefinite interactions within the closely-held context. Perhaps the most interesting observation to emerge is that infinitely-repeated play is unable to support what is perhaps the most intuitive "cooperative" strategy profile: exclusive expenditure of productive effort by both parties (which would give them an expected payoff of $32 each). Indeed, in order to support any dynamic norm that is not an equilibrium of the one-shot game, it is necessary for the players to have access to a commonlyobservable signal alerting them as to whether a defection has occurred, thereby triggering a subsequent punishment scheme.
93 Such a signal, however, would never be feasible if the partes were to engage exclusively in effort during each period. Indeed, because the expenditure of effort is not verifiable without monitoring, it would impossible to detect whether one's counterpart has deviated from the prescribed equilibrium. Consequently, in order to trigger a punishment scheme, the By "easiest to enforce," I am referring the punishment scheme that will induce cooperation for the largest range of potential discount rates. In general, the so-called Folk Theorems from game theory mandate that a punishment scheme will render a cooperative norm enforceable only if players are sufficiently "patient" (i.e., their discount rates are sufficiently low). Choosing the most unattractive punishment ensures the enforceability of a cooperative norm for the highest possible degree of impatience. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd "cooperative norm" must either involve either a small probability of shirking and monitoring in each period (so as to make the generation of such a signal possible), or it must utilize an indirect signal, such as an observed string of unsuccessful outcomes for a prescribed number of rounds. 94 Both of these norms have the (relatively unappealing) feature of breaking down with some positive probability as the game continues.
Nevertheless, with either of these cooperative norms, viability depends on a punishment scheme that is sufficiently unattractive so as to deter deviations by either party. In turn, this implies that ceteris paribus, a cooperative norm is easiest to enforce when the consequence of defection is to play out indefinitely the most unattractive one-shot equilibrium for a detected deviator. 95 As demonstrated above, the content of fiduciary duties (i.e., the value of θ) plays a central role in determining the payoffs from such one-shot equilibria. Accordingly, the enforcement of a cooperative dynamic norm hinges (in part) on determining which of the feasible oneshot equilibria from subsection (b) would be the most unappealing to a potential defector.
Consider, for instance, a value of θ=1 within Region 3, corresponding to total disgorgement of a fiduciary's payoffs. Although the large initial damages in this Region creates a partial immediate disincentive to shirking, the subsequent punishment scheme is relatively mild, giving each player an expected payoff of approximately $30.40 in each subsequent round. Consequently, in this Region it is difficult to support any cooperative norm that prescribes little or no monitoring, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. The Figure presupposes that players discount future payoffs at approximately 5%, and illustrates the per-period expected payoffs that are sustainable under infinitely-repeated play. The expected payoffs from the static game in Region 3 are represented by point V in the Figure. Using infinite repetition of this static outcome as the punishment scheme, one finds that the repeat play increases each player's per-period expected payoffs to point W, an increase in expected social surplus of $0.60 per period.
In contrast, consider the effects of a smaller value of θ in Region 1, where it is possible to employ the two asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria as post-detection punishment schemes. For instance, one could require a detected shirker to assume the Sisyphean role as the sole contributor of effort for every period thereafter. Indeed, such a scheme would give a deviator a payoff of $27 in each period-clearly the least attractive private outcome from static play. These static payoffs are illustrated by points X and Y in Figure 3 . Using them as the prospective punishment schemes, it is possible to support a dynamic norm at point Z, which gives each player an expected per period payoff of $31.40-an expected social gain of $0.80 per period over either of the asymmetric equilibria in that Region. Moreover, the most efficient dynamic norm in Region 1 comes much closer to first-best (falling $1.20 short) than does that in Region 3 (falling $2.60 short). Although this analysis is quite cursory, it holds at least two important lessons. First, it strongly suggests that the content of the legal rule, by affecting the plausible equilibria of a one-shot game, can indeed play in important role in determining the viability of cooperative norms. Second, and probably more importantly, it implies that dynamic play need not reverse the conclusions derived for the one-shot game, and in fact may strengthen them.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
The central thesis of this paper-that fiduciary duties can impose unique strategic costs on team members within closely held firms-is not simply a conceptual curiosity. Indeed, a number implications for law logically flow from this observation. In this section, I will concentrate on two. First, the above analysis suggests that it may be advisable for statutory business law to permit closely-held firms to "opt into" their most appropriate fiduciary protections, and for courts to honor this choice. Second, if such statutory permutations are inadvisable or infeasible, then judges, when adjudicating such cases within closely-held firms, would be well-advised to take teamproduction considerations into account.
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See note ___ supra.
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See DeMott, supra note ___.
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E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd a. Statutory Law
A principal lesson of the analysis above is that it is largely impossible for one to diagnose, at least on a priori grounds, whether a randomly-selected firm will exhibit greater deterrence or monitoring effects. Indeed, which effect dominates ultimately comes down to a number of factors, such as deep pockets, non-team beneficiaries, and the prospects for repeat play, which may or may not individually be satisfied within different firms. If, however, the members of the productive team are themselves in a position to diagnose their organizational characteristics ex ante, then it seems likely that they would jointly prefer a governance structure that matches their organizational needs. As such, their choice of legal states would constitute a signal of their governance preferences. For instance, if Firm X begins productive operations without invoking any statutory formalities, then one might interpret this action to reveal a preference to be treated as a partnership, subject to strict fiduciary standards. If, on the other hand, the participants in Firm X make the costly choice of incorporation, they might signal a preference to be subjected to more lax fiduciary standards, similar to those of public corporations.
In many ways, this description is not too far from the way things currently stand in most states. However, there are some important caveats. Most importantly, this argument presumes a credible integrity of both the strictness in fiduciary law among partnerships and a reciprocal permissiveness for close corporations (at least as default matters). Indeed, obligations of this sort are perhaps the most difficult and costly to memorialize in a partnership agreement, corporate charter or analogous document. Without a notorious mechanism permitting such inexpensive ex ante selfselection, the freedom to "contract out of the default rule" (to the extent that one exists) might represent little more than a pyrrhic victory. Significantly, as the overview in section II illustrated, the fiduciary contents of both partnership and close corporation law appear to be converging. On the one hand, the slackening of fiduciary standards within the RUPA 96 suggests that partnership law has been creeping (or perhaps racing) in the direction of corporate principles 97 . Symmetrically, the increasing popularity of the "partnership analogy" 98 in close corporations law has given rise to considerable momentum in the opposite direction. Should fiduciary duty law within these two statutory areas merge completely, the relatively inexpensive ability to "opt into" an off-the-rack set of fiduciary standards would likely be lost.
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See TAN ___-___, supra. But even if the integrity between these two areas of law were to be maintained, two significant problems remain. First, as noted above, 99 incorporation tends to send a "noisy" signal about one's organizational needs. In addition to fiduciary concerns, such an act could reveal a desire for (among other things) differing tax treatment, limited liability, or infinite duration. Constraining one's assessment to the binary choice between a general partnership and a close corporation thus creates an indeterminacy about a firm's revealed preferences. The increasing roles played by limited partnerships, LLCs, LLPs, and other statutory permutations may help ease this signaling problem. But with fiduciary law in many of these areas still vastly underdeveloped, 100 it remains to be seen whether this added heterogeneity will prove helpful.
Second, the self-selection argument presumes both that team members will be able to identify their appropriate organizational characteristics ex ante, and that they will then proceed to implement the value-maximizing outcome. Both of these presumptions may, in some situations, be unfounded. Indeed, while the stylized "rational actor" is by definition not prone to errors, business decisions within most contexts are made amid profound risk and uncertainty-factors that have been longknown to generate cognitive pathologies in more "mortal" decision-makers. 101 If the members of closely-held firms are often similarly afflicted, their decision about organizational form may reveal little about their preference for fiduciary obligations. Moreover, even if team members could recognize the appropriate structure ex ante, their ultimate choice of organizational form may still be a product of collective negotiation. If significant transaction, information, or coordination costs undermine their endeavors to bargain, the outcome may also constitute a poor signal.
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Perhaps these limitations are significant enough-at least to some-to render the self-selection argument untrustworthy. If so, then there may be an alternative mechanism for taking team-production concerns into account: judges themselves.
See supra TAN ___-___. Assuming (for argument's sake) that statutory self-selection is either unattractive or infeasible, it may be possible to incorporate team-production concerns into a unitary fiduciary law, but one animated by casuistry and fact-specific determinations. Indeed, by paying close attention to organizational details, a judge may be able to diagnose whether a closely-held firm is dominated by deterrence or monitoring effects. In particular, many of the variations explored at the end of section III help to suggest just what effects might be important in making such a determination.
Consider, for instance, the existence of non-productive fiduciary beneficiaries, such as silent partners or non-managerial shareholders. As noted above, 103 such individuals need not substitute away from productive effort in order to monitor, and there may therefore be reason to accord them stronger fiduciary rights than their productive counterparts. It may be possible, then, for a court to account for teamproduction concerns by determining whether the instant plaintiff is also a member of the productive team, and selecting the appropriate standard accordingly. Such an approach, moreover, may also be of assistance in distinguishing a number of cases that seem to cut against the distinctions often asserted between partnerships and incorporated entities. For example, the recent Texas case of Bohatch v. Butler & Binion 104 took a rather weak stand on fiduciary duties when it refused to extend protection to a partner in a law-firm who was expelled for attempting to expose alleged practices of over-billing by one of her colleagues. Finding that whistleblowing retaliation did not constitute an "improper purpose" for invoking the expulsion provision in the partnership agreement, the court held that a partner could be expelled for "purely business reasons" without violating fiduciary duties. In contrast to Bohatch is the well-known Massachusetts case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. 105 (discussed above), which employed a partnership analogy to impose a strict fiduciary duty within a close corporation. Specifically, Donahue held that a the managers of a close corporation violated their fiduciary duties to a shareholder when they refused to extend the same attractive buy-out terms to her that they had to the former manager (their father) upon his retirement.
Side-by-side, the outcomes of Bohatch and Donohue seem to articulate not only differing outcomes, but also divergent conceptions of fiduciary law. Moreover, these competing conceptions seem vaguely counter-intuitive, given that it was the partnership case that pronounced the weaker form of legal obligation. Nevertheless, To be sure, Bohatch involved other factors that might have cut the other way, even within a strict efficiency analysis. For example, Butler & Binion's clients might have preferred the maintenance of strong whistle-blowing incentives if the costs of intra-firm monitoring could be recaptured by clients in the form of better legal representation or fee rebates. Nonetheless, this argument does not negate the existence of intra-team monitoring costs as an important factor worthy of consideration.
E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd if one takes into account the productive roles of the two respective plaintiffs, the outcomes (and the analyses) appear more justifiable. Indeed, Donahue involved a plaintiff who played absolutely no productive role at the firm, having come into her ownership stake from her late spouse, a former productive team member. 106 Bohatch, in contrast, involved a beneficiary who simultaneously engaged in productive activities at the firm, and she was in fact one of only three attorneys in the branch office where she worked. Moreover, it appears that the majority in Bohatch was not only aware of the potential problems with team-production concerns, but they predicated much of their opinion exclusively on the dangers presented by intra-team conflict:
We are sensitive to the concern expressed by the dissenting Justices that "retaliation against a partner who tries in good faith to correct or report perceived misconduct virtually assures that others will not take these appropriate steps in the future." However, the dissenting Justices do not explain how the trust relationship necessary both for the firm's existence and for representing clients can survive such serious accusations by one partner against another. The threat of tort liability for expulsion would tend to force partners to remain in untenable circumstance-suspicious of and angry with each other-to their own detriment and that of their clients whose matters are neglected by lawyers distracted with intra-firm frictions. 107 This passage almost certainly reflects a general, intuitive understanding of the governance problems presented when a firm's fiduciaries wear the dual hats of producer and monitor. It is a doctrinal development that is perfectly consistent (and indeed suggested) by the analysis set forth section III. 108 Just as in the non-productive beneficiary case, it may be possible for courts to use other factual premises in diagnosing fiduciary disputes within closely-held firms. As noted in the previous section, the existence of deep pockets, the prevalence of severe free riding problems, and the history and/or future likelihood of repeat play might all constitute component parts in a unified fiduciary duty doctrine applied on Judge-made law, of course, is not without its own hazards. Most notably, ex post adjudication comes at a cost of greater litigation costs expended by the parties. Moreover, the outcomes meted out by courts may be difficult to predict from the merits of the case and therefore highly uncertain. 110 In addition, it is not obvious that judges will always be able to identify the facts relevant to team-production considerations. If such problems are sufficiently severe, it may be better to opt for statutory self-selection (notwithstanding its own apparent shortcomings). Such objections, however, while worthy of consideration, do not absolve us from requiring that someone-be it judges (acting ex post), the parties themselves (acting ex ante), or perhaps legislatures (seemingly always acting)-make these often important decisions. Moreover, it appears from the above discussion that judges already are doing so in some cases, 111 and probably cannot avoid having more of them land in their collective laps. Finally, absolute ex post judicial accuracy is often unnecessary to induce efficient upstream behavior, particularly if courts tend to get it right on average.
112 Consequently, the utility of intra-firm monitoring concerns for legal doctrine is difficult to ignore.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Few concepts within business law have proven to be as simultaneously thought-provoking and frustrating as fiduciary obligations. Readily lending themselves to numerous positive and normative accounts, fiduciary duties lie at the core of most of the interesting and intractable debates within both case law and the organizational governance literature. This article has attempted to contribute to those For example, the analysis above might have interesting applications if one introduced exit options on top of fiduciary duties. Mahoney, for example, supra note __, conjectures that the apparent infrequency of contractual exit options in close corporations may be due to protections afforded by strong fiduciary duties. If such strong fiduciary duties impose costly incentives to monitor, however, then exit options might be a better mechanism for protecting minority interests. E:\Team\NoINTeam.wpd debates (and perhaps even problematize them). Focusing on the role of intra-firm monitoring costs within productive teams, I have argued that strict fiduciary duties in closely-held firms may have profound and unexpected effects, which in turn can undermine the putative purposes of such obligations. To be sure, I have focused predominantly on one such phenomenon, and other attempts may reveal even more important insights than those heralded here. 113 Be that as it may, the analysis above suggests that team-production concerns hold important implications for fiduciary law-lessons that deserve to be kept (to borrow a familiar refrain) at a higher level than that trodden by the crowd.
